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 Attending to Equality: Criminal Law, 
the Charter and Competitive Truths 
Rosemary Cairns Way 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In November 2001, Justice Rosalie Abella delivered a keynote ad-
dress on the challenges of judging in the 21st century.1 Her remarks were 
provocative, moving, aspirational and multidisciplinary, weaving music, 
literature, contemporary culture, the media, history and current events 
into reflections on the judicial task. Justice Abella succinctly captured the 
social dynamic of the 1950s, writing: “The ‘truth’ was obvious, compli-
ance was expected, and competitive truths and their adherents were 
squelched.”2 Although written as part of Justice Abella’s “impressionistic 
justice journey”3 through the late 20th century, her discussion of the 
power of competitive truths resonated with my thinking about this essay. 
This paper was presented as part of the 15th Annual Osgoode Constitu-
tional Cases Conference, a conference which this year marked the 30th 
anniversary of the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.4 It was delivered as part of a panel entitled “The Justness of 
Criminal Justice: How Has the Charter Changed the Problems We 
Face?”, in which panellists were asked to “reflect on the social justice 
issues raised in the criminal justice system and how those issues have 
remained, changed or been redressed over the life of the Charter”. We 
were charged with critically examining how our understanding and 
response to crime has changed over the past 30 years. More specifically, 
we were asked what, if anything, the Charter had to do with it. My 
discussion is limited to the substantive criminal law of blame and 
punishment. I will not be concentrating on jurisprudential details, but 
                                                                                                             
 Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. 
1 Rosalie Silberman Abella, “Judging in the 21st Century” (2001-2002) 25 Advocates’ Q. 
131. 
2 Id., at 133. 
3 Id., at 132. 
4 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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rather on broad concepts. My analysis is impressionistic and personal, 
and it reflects my commitments as a critical feminist and as an educator 
of future criminal justice professionals. My argument is this. We need to 
both seek out and pay more attention to the competitive truths about 
criminal law. The most destabilizing competitive truth about criminal law 
which has emerged over the last 30 years is that the criminal law raises 
equality issues. The Charter has had something (but not much) to do with 
that. In my view, the criminal justice system’s capacity to respond to 
social justice issues will be enhanced when equality values are fully and 
substantively incorporated into our “truths” about criminal law. And, as a 
corollary, the failure to incorporate equality will hinder our attempts to 
respond to the social justice challenges that permeate our criminal justice 
system. To be clear, this is primarily a claim about the incorporation of 
the equality value, a value which courts have repeatedly insisted should 
be central to the development of the law,5 and not a claim about the 
application of section 15 of the Charter.6 Incorporating equality requires 
deliberate attention to perspective, context, power, vulnerability, pres-
ence and absence.7 It is difficult and it is complicated. But, as the 
Canadian Judicial Council suggests in Ethical Principles for Judges, it is 
“at the core of justice according to law”.8 
                                                                                                             
5 In Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto,
 
[1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 
at para. 92 (S.C.C.), the Court concluded: 
The Charter represents a restatement of the fundamental values which guide and shape 
our democratic society and our legal system. It follows that it is appropriate for the courts 
to make such incremental revisions to the common law as may be necessary to have it 
comply with the values enunciated in the Charter. 
See, generally, Peter Hogg, “Equality as a Charter Value in Constitutional Litigation” (2003) 20 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 113. 
6 Many commentators, advocates and activists are increasingly discouraged about the 
complex and unsatisfactory evolution of s. 15 jurisprudence. See, generally, the collection of essays 
in Sheila McIntyre & Sanda Rodgers, eds., Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Markham: ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2006) and Fay Faraday, 
Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive 
Equality under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006). 
7 Rosemary Cairns Way, “Reconceptualizing Professional Responsibility: Incorporating 
Equality” (2002) 25 Dal. L.J. 27, at 33. See also Patricia Hughes, “Recognizing Substantive Equality 
as a Foundational Constitutional Principle” (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 5. 
8 The Canadian Judicial Council, in its statement of Ethical Principles for Judges, identi-
fies equality as one of its five basic principles, and counsels judges to “conduct themselves and 
proceedings before them so as to assure equality according to law”. A commentary on equality 
recognizes both the challenge and the centrality of the principle. 
The Constitution and a variety of statutes enshrine a strong commitment to equality be-
fore and under the law and equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination. 
This is not a commitment to identical treatment but rather “... to the equal worth and 
human dignity of all persons” and ... “a desire to rectify and prevent discrimination 
against particular groups suffering social, political and legal disadvantage in our society.” 
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II. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
What are the social justice issues raised by the criminal justice sys-
tem? In my view, everything about our criminal justice system is perme-
ated with social justice implications. I understand the term social justice 
to refer broadly to the relationship(s) between law and the issues which 
face vulnerable communities.9 Social justice scholarship emphasizes 
analysis and critique of the role of law in the development and mainte-
nance of social, political and economic inequality, and encourages 
reflection on law’s potential to be an instrument for social change. In 
Canada, social justice scholarship is attentive to the needs of historically 
marginalized groups including, inter alia, poor people, people challenged 
by mental illness or addiction, Aboriginal peoples, members of ethnic, 
religious and sexual minority communities, racialized individuals, 
women, children and the undereducated. All of these groups are overrep-
resented in the criminal justice system, as accused persons, convicted 
offenders, prison inmates, victims and witnesses, and, just as importantly, 
as the family, neighbours and community of those listed above.10 One 
                                                                                                             
Moreover, Canadian law recognizes that discrimination is concerned not only with intent, 
but with effects. Quite apart from explicit constitutional and statutory guarantees, fair and 
equal treatment has long been regarded as an essential attribute of justice. While its de-
mands in particular situations are sometimes far from self evident, the law’s strong so-
cietal commitment places concern for equality at the core of justice according to law. 
Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges, online: <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/cmslib/
general/news_pub_judicialconduct_Principles_en.pdf>, at 23-24. The five principles are judicial 
independence, integrity, diligence, equality and impartiality. 
9 This is the definition of social justice used by the social justice teaching group at the 
University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law. See the Faculty of Common Law’s webpage on Law and 
Social Justice, online: Faculty of Law, Common Law Section <http://www.commonlaw.uottawa.ca/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=629&Itemid=161&pid=161&lang=en>. 
10 Ontario, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice 
System (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 1995), online: Legislative Assembly of Ontario 
<http://www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/mon/25005/185733.pdf>; David Tanovich, The Colour of 
Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006); Public Safety Canada, Corrections 
and Conditional Release Statistical Overview 2011, online: <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/
rep/2011-ccrso-eng.aspx> reports that 8.9 per cent of federal offenders are Black. This proportion 
has been increasing for at least the last three years (2010 — Black offenders made up 7.9 per cent of 
the population; 2009 – Black offenders made up 7.4 per cent of the population; 2008 — Black 
offenders made up 6.9 per cent of the offender population). Statistics Canada reports that 2.2 per 
cent of the Canadian population is Black. In other words, Black Canadians are overrepresented in 
federal correction institutions by a factor of 4. Jonathan Rudin, “Addressing Aboriginal Overrepre-
sentation Post-Gladue: A Realistic Assessment of How Social Change Occurs” (2008-2009) 54 
Crim. L.Q., 447, at 451: “[T]he 2006/2007 ... figures from Statistics Canada show that Aboriginal 
people make up 20 per cent of the jail population in provincial facilities, up from 16 per cent in 
2001. Currently, over 1 in 5 inmates in federal and provincial jails are Aboriginal. For women, 
almost one in three women in jail is Aboriginal. And the figures are even worse for youth.” Canada, 
Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator 
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need only spend a day or two in a busy criminal courthouse to observe 
what systemic and structural inequality look like in Canada. And one 
need only glance at the annual reports prepared by the Office of the 
Correctional Investigator to appreciate that our prisons are disproportion-
ately occupied by those whose lives have been compromised by social 
injustice.11 Consider, for example, the following snapshot of lived social 
injustice, a profile of federally sentenced women extracted from the most 
recent Report of the Correctional Investigator: 
1. In the last 10 years, the number of Aboriginal women in custody has 
increased by 86.4 per cent, compared to 25.7 per cent over the same 
period for Aboriginal men. 
                                                                                                             
(2008-2009), online: <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20082009-eng.aspx>: “Aboriginal 
rates of incarceration are now almost nine times the national average”. Corrections Canada, Profile 
of a Canadian Offender (January 2010), online: Correctional Service of Canada <http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/qf/pdf/07-eng.pdf> reported that: 13 per cent of male offenders and 24 per cent 
of female offenders have very serious mental health problems on admission; there is a “prevalence” 
of learning disabilities as well as offenders with low functioning capacities; 75 per cent of offenders 
have a serious substance abuse problem; and a high rate of infectious diseases (7-10 times the 
national average for HIV and 30 times the national average for Hepatitis C). See also with respect to 
mental illness, the presentation of Howard Sapers, Correctional Investigator of Canada, Speaking 
Notes (Appearance before the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, May 25, 2009), at 
7-9, online: Office of the Correctional Investigator <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/comm/sp-all/sp-
all20090525-eng.aspx> and Canada, Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the 
Office of the Correctional Investigator (2008-2009), at 2-6, 15, online: <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/
rpt/annrpt/annrpt20082009-eng.aspx>). See, as well, K. Roach & A. Bailey, “The Relevance of Fetal 
Alcohol Spectrum Disorder in Canadian Criminal Law from Investigation to Sentencing” (2009) 42 
U.B.C. L. Rev. 1, at 11. Roach and Bailey cite studies which suggest that at least 10 per cent of the 
carceral population suffers from some form of FASD, 10 times its presence in the general population 
(at 8-9), and that half of the individuals suffering from FASD experience incarceration (at 9). See, as 
well, the position paper of the Canadian Psychiatric Association, The Treatment of Mental Illness 
in Correctional Institutions (November 2011), online: <http://publications.cpa-apc.org/media.php?
mid=1249>, which argues, inter alia, in Canadian Psychiatric Association, Media Communiqué, 
“Psychiatrists urge government to address worsening mental health problems among inmates” 
(December 7, 2011), online: <http://www.cpa-apc.org/media.php?mid=1664>: 
The current situation is the result of poorly planned deinstitutionalization. Hospital bed 
closures have been too rapid and too extensive. Community resources have been under-
funded and limited. The result has been a fragmented healthcare system where no one has 
taken responsibility for the care of one of the most disadvantaged and marginalized popu-
lations. Many people suffering from serious mental illnesses end up incarcerated in part 
due to the lack of resources to treat them in the community, with the result that correc-
tional facilities have become de facto psychiatric institutions. Access to care for many 
only occurs after they have been criminalized. ... If the government does not include a 
robust mental health strategy with its aggressive stance on justice policy, the mental 
health crisis in our prisons will worsen. It’s time to stop using prisons as a parallel 
healthcare system for people with mental illness. 
11 See the wealth of information available online at the Office of the Correctional Investiga-
tor: <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/index-eng.aspx>. 
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2. Thirty-four per cent of the incarcerated women offender population 
is Aboriginal. 
3. In 2010, 86 per cent of women offenders reported histories of 
physical abuse, and 68 per cent reported a history of sexual abuse at 
some point in their lives, representing an increase of 19 per cent and 
15 per cent respectively since 1991. 
4. Approximately 45 per cent of women offenders reported having less 
than a high school education at intake. 
5. In 2009, 29 per cent of women offenders were identified at admis-
sion as presenting mental health problems, and this proportion has 
more than doubled over the past decade. 
6. Thirty-one per cent of women were identified, at intake, as having a 
past mental health diagnosis, representing a 63 per cent increase 
over the past decade. 
7. Since 2003, at intake, approximately 77 per cent of women have 
reported abusing both alcohol and drugs. 
8. Just under one-half of women self-report having engaged in self-
harming behaviour.12 
These statistics provide painful evidence of what we know. We dispro-
portionately incarcerate the marginalized, and the Charter seems to have 
had little impact on our tendency to do so. The administration of criminal 
justice in Canada is overflowing with social justice issues. As criminal 
justice professionals, we have a public obligation to respond. 
III. THE RELEVANCE OF THE CHARTER 
Five years ago, Professor Roach argued that, despite its pervasive-
ness, and despite manifestly just results in a number of important cases, 
the Charter was in fact of limited relevance to the justness of criminal 
justice.13 In a wide-ranging discussion of significant criminal justice 
issues, he offered what he described as “a sense of perspective”14 about 
                                                                                                             
12 M. Barrett, K. Allenby & K. Taylor, Twenty Years Later: Revisiting the Task Force on 
Federally Sentenced Women, Research Report 2010 No. R-222 (July 2010), online: Correctional 
Service Canada <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/reports/r222/r222-eng.shtml>; Public Safety 
Canada, Corrections and Conditional Release Statistical Overview: Annual Report 2010 (December 
2010), online: <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/rep/_fl/2010-ccrso-eng.pdf>. 
13 Kent Roach, “A Charter Reality Check: How Relevant Is the Charter to the Justness of 
Our Criminal Justice System?” [hereinafter “Roach”] in Jamie Cameron & James Stribopoulos, eds., 
The Charter and Criminal Justice: Twenty-Five Years Later (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada 
2008) [hereinafter “Cameron & Stribopoulos”] 717, at 719. 
14 Id., at 718. 
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the relevance of the Charter and cautioned that the justness of criminal 
justice might have more to do with Parliament than the courts. In my 
view, this cautious assessment of the Charter’s impact reflects an 
important truth of criminal justice. Criminal justice problems are inher-
ently multi-dimensional. Solutions are necessarily multi-factorial and 
often beyond the capacity of courts. It is naïve to assume that Charter 
rights alone are capable of generating or sustaining the range of prag-
matic, theoretical, political and systemic changes necessary to ameliorate 
even some of what is unjust about criminal justice. But Charter rights are 
not irrelevant. Their relevance and their potential depend on one’s views 
about what might make the criminal justice system more just. Those 
views will, of necessity, reflect subjective preferences about what counts 
as justice and what a criminal justice system should achieve. In his recent 
book, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice, William Stuntz 
suggests that a decent criminal justice system must “produce justice, 
avoid discrimination, protect those who most need the law’s protection, 
keep crime in check, and maintain reasonable limits on criminal punish-
ment.”15 For me, a “just” criminal justice system does all of those things 
and does it in a way which is fair, humane and efficient. Its structure and 
norms reflect Charter values, especially the values of equality and liberty. 
It functions in a manner consistent with the kind of democracy described 
by Dickson C.J.C. in Oakes,16 one which embodies: 
[R]espect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to 
social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, 
respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political 
institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups 
in society.17 
In approach it is deeply contextualized, recognizing, acknowledging and 
reflecting the shifting social contexts in which it operates, as well as the 
social and political particularity of the participants. 
Acknowledging the social justice reality of the criminal justice sys-
tem is both challenging and destabilizing. It is difficult to square the 
liberal individualism which characterizes dominant theories of responsi-
bility and blame, an individualism which is premised on individual 
dignity, the capacity for choice, and formal equality of treatment, with 
                                                                                                             
15 William Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 2011), at 2. 
16 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
17 Id., at 132 (S.C.R.). 
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the systemic social and structural inequalities which characterize the 
lives of those most likely to be caught up in the system. As Mark Kelman 
trenchantly observed: “Pure-choice theorists must at least be quite 
bothered by the disproportionate number of criminals who were victims 
of racism, poverty, and unstable and abusing families ... we must wonder 
about the meaningfulness of blaming those who we can so readily 
understand.”18 More recently, Ben Berger, describing what he calls “the 
gothic majesty of law’s independence from social inequality”,19 argues 
that “we need our criminals to expiate our social sins of callous disregard 
for social dislocation and deep societal inequality”20 and suggests that 
recognizing the key role of social and political contributors to crime 
“would complicate to the point of structural paralysis the question of 
assigning guilt and responsibility”.21 I suspect he is right. The methodol-
ogy of criminal law requires a narrowing time frame in order to focus on 
individual blameworthiness.22 This time narrowing, although functionally 
defensible, has the effect of rendering the systemic social and political 
factors which contributed to the occurrence of criminalized harm, 
invisible. It is hard to imagine an alternative system that could fully 
incorporate the systemic contexts which inform human behaviour, while 
at the same time responding to the personal victimization which the 
criminal law seeks to legitimately name, denounce and deter. However, 
in my view, the system’s ongoing legitimacy depends on our collective 
willingness to acknowledge the tension between theory and reality. We 
need to ask whether the inegalitarian impacts of the criminal law are the 
necessary and inevitable collateral damage of a system whose central 
organizing principle is individual responsibility.23 And, even if we 
conclude that they are, we surely have an obligation to ensure that the 
system does not unnecessarily exacerbate the unequal social contexts in 
which it operates. 
I argue that questions about the justness of criminal justice, and 
about the Charter’s responsive and constitutive role with respect to 
                                                                                                             
18 M. Kelman, “The Origins of Crime and Criminal Violence” in D. Kairys, ed., The Poli-
tics of Law: A Progressive Critique (New York: Pantheon, 1982) 214, at 220. 
19 Benjamin Berger, “Mental Disorder and the Instability of Blame in Criminal Law” in 
Francois Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos, eds., Rethinking Criminal Law Theory (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2012), at 118. 
20 Id., at 119. 
21 Id. 
22 Mark Kelman, “Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law” (1980-1981) 
33 Stan. L. Rev. 591. 
23 Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to the Criminal Law, 2d 
ed. (London: Butterworths, 2001), at 10-14. 
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justness, turn, at least in part, upon the ways in which Charter analysis 
potentially unearths, renders visible and potentiates criminal justice 
responses to systemic inequality. In other words, has Charter analysis 
encouraged the emergence of competitive truths which displace or 
disrupt the often abstract, and sometimes complacent, individualism of 
much criminal theory?24 Can we link those competitive truths to the 
discourse of rights, or, at least to the discourse of Charter values? In what 
follows, I will briefly examine two ways in which the Charter has had an 
impact on how we conceptualize criminal justice issues, and suggest that 
these shifts may allow us to respond more constructively to the social 
justice issues which permeate the criminal law. 
IV. COMPLICATING BLAME 
The dominant narrative of the Supreme Court’s initial foray into con-
stitutionalized fault is that the Court moved from “bold idealism” to 
“cautious contextualism”,25 from a “burst of enthusiasm” to a period of 
“consolidation” and “retrenchment”.26 In the Motor Vehicle Reference27 
the Court did two things. First, it signalled its intention to take section 7 
seriously by refusing to be constrained by a substance/procedure debate 
which, in its view, had no relevance in the Canadian context. Second, the 
Court jumped at the opportunity to follow the jurisprudential path 
championed by Dickson J. in Sault Ste. Marie.28 What was previously a 
matter of criminal law policy became a matter of constitutional entitle-
ment, and the potential individualized unfairness of absolute liability 
which concerned Dickson J. in the regulatory context was recast as a 
denial of fundamental justice. Justice Wilson, in a compelling dissent, 
focused on the combination of absolute liability and mandatory impris-
onment.29 For her, fundamental justice was about more than “moral 
innocence”, however defined. It was about the combination of automatic 
imprisonment with absolute liability, a combination which in her view 
                                                                                                             
24 Id., at 15-32. 
25 Roach, supra, note 13, at 718. 
26 Justice Marc Rosenberg, “Introduction” in Cameron & Stribopoulos, supra, note 13, at 
lxiv. 
27 Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle Reference”]. 
28 R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978] S.C.J. No. 59, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 (S.C.C.). 
29 Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 27, at para. 103. 
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was both unreasonable, extravagant, disproportionate and incompatible 
with the principle that punishment should be kept to a minimum.30 
The decisions in R. v. Vaillancourt31 and R. v. Martineau32 took the 
debate about moral innocence and applied it to an arguably anachronistic 
murder provision. Moral innocence became, in the context of murder, a 
constitutional requirement of subjective intention with respect to death. 
Unwilling to moor its analysis in the simple fact of gross disproportional-
ity between a mandatory life sentence and the wide spectrum of inten-
tions captured by the felony murder rule, the Court articulated a test 
dependent on stigma that became ultimately unmanageable, and which 
led to constitutional analysis almost breathtaking in its circularity. Alan 
Young has suggested that the principle of fundamental justice identified 
in the Motor Vehicle Reference — the principle of no imprisonment 
without fault — “may have been full of sound and fury signifying 
nothing”.33 Jamie Cameron, who characterizes the constitutionalization 
of mens rea as “no more than a modest success”34 suggests that while 
both “Vaillancourt and Martineau raised the spectre of radical reforms to 
the criminal law”,35 the Court was ultimately unprepared to engage in the 
kinds of whole scale restructuring which a fully realized commitment to 
subjectivism might have required. She writes: 
[T]he constitutionalization of mens rea ended with Creighton and its 
companion cases. Commentators saw wholesale retreat, if not an about-
face, in the post-Martineau decisions. ... To this day, it is a matter of 
disappointment to some that the MVR’s promise remains largely 
unfulfilled.36 
My narrative of this story is different. In my view, the early stages of 
constitutionalized fault represented the seamless merger of an evolving 
common law commitment to subjectivism37 with the liberal individual-
ism of the Court’s initial approach to the Charter. There are many reasons 
that the Court adopted this stance, including a desire to distance itself 
from Bill of Rights decisions, a need to forcefully respond to the legiti-
                                                                                                             
30 Id., at para. 128. 
31 [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.). 
32 [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.). 
33 Alan Young, “Done Nothing Wrong: Fundamental Justice and the Minimum Content of 
Criminal Law” in Cameron & Stribopoulos, supra, note 13, 441, at 482-83. 
34 Jamie Cameron, “Fault and Punishment under Sections 7 and 12 of the Charter” in Came-
ron & Stribopoulos, id., 553, at 569. 
35 Id., at 563. 
36 Id., at 569. 
37 R. v. Pappajohn, [1980] S.C.J. No. 51, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120 (S.C.C.). 
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macy critique, and a belief that the line between policy and law was 
discernible. The problem, in my view, was that the Court’s claims about 
the relationship between subjectivism and innocence were devoid of 
political and normative context. The combination of eager idealism, 
fondness for overarching conceptual coherence, and an uncompromising 
commitment to subjectivism masked the complexity and context-specific 
nature of assessments of blame. In the context of sexual assault, femi-
nists had long argued that privileging subjectivism in fact immunized 
male perspectives on sexual communication at the same time as it 
ignored the gendered stereotypes which informed that perspective.38 
Feminists also argued that entrenching subjectivism would dismantle the 
doctrinal distinction between specific and general intent offences, a 
distinction which, on the ground, seemed to benefit those most at risk 
from being victimized by intoxicated sexual violence. 
In 1992, I worried that we were moving inexorably towards an un-
critical constitutionalization of subjectivism.39 I was wrong, of course. 
Ironically, the constitutionalization of mens rea seems to have “stalled” 
because the dramatic political and constitutional implications of en-
trenching a particular construct of blame became apparent, and the Court 
dug in its heels. Although not articulated as such, I think that this 
unwillingness reflected the Court’s eventual acknowledgement of the 
complexity of blame. A competing truth about blame and responsibility 
emerged. Different criminal harms occur in different social contexts. A 
contextual, crime-by-crime approach to fault was more apt to respond 
to these social context nuances than a one-size-fits-all commitment to 
subjectivist theory. The post-Creighton40 fault decisions were a re-
trenchment from the expansive potential of the early cases, but they were 
not regressive. Rather, they were a progressive and appropriate response 
to the multi-dimensional interests affected by criminal law, interests 
which the Court was beginning to take seriously. 
                                                                                                             
38 See text infra and accompanying notes. 
39 Rosemary Cairns Way, “The Charter, the Supreme Court and the Invisible Politics of 
Fault” (1993) 12 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 128. 
40 R. v. Creighton, [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) ATTENDING TO EQUALITY 49 
V. RECOGNIZING EQUALITY 
In my view, the constitutional ideal of equality is the most obvious 
potential catalyst for the reconceptualization of criminal justice issues.41 
Thirty years ago, the idea that the criminal law raised equality issues was 
both unfamiliar and largely misunderstood. The dominant conception of 
the criminal law was, for the most part, devoid of equality awareness and 
binary in nature, with state power to name and punish criminal behaviour 
counterbalanced by the classical liberal (freedom from) rights afforded 
the individual accused. In the criminal law, judicial intervention on 
behalf of the accused was likely to be seen as both rights-promoting and 
costless, primarily because courts failed to acknowledge the rights-
denying potential associated with limiting state power as well as the anti-
egalitarian nature of a number of criminal law norms. Recognizing the 
multi-dimensionality of the interests at stake in the criminal law renders 
the relationship of the Charter, which protects both liberty and equality, 
to the substantive criminal law exceedingly complex. 
Christine Boyle put it succinctly almost 20 years ago. She argued 
that equality had never been in the forefront of “thinking about the 
overall burdens and benefits of criminal prohibitions”,42 and that courts 
and lawyers preferred to characterize criminal law questions in terms of 
fundamental justice, fair trial and privacy rights. She argued that “it is a 
liberal illusion that equality concerns are effectively addressed by 
considerations of power imbalances as between the state and the ac-
cused,”43 and insisted that the criminal law needed to pay attention to all 
the other inequalities perpetuated, exacerbated and ignored by the 
system. 
The reconceptualization of sexual assault which culminated in the 
1992 reforms offers a powerful example of the impact of equality.44 In 
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my view, both the actual reframing of sexual assault law and the manner 
in which it was achieved exemplify an operationalized commitment to 
equality. The reform was the culmination of the concerted, unrelenting 
and determined efforts of Canadian feminists. Two characteristics of that 
movement were of particular legal significance. First was the explicit 
recognition of the multi-dimensionality of the issues and the range of 
rights claims which needed to be acknowledged and accommodated. This 
recognition was manifested in the broad range of stakeholders who 
participated in a consultative and deliberate re-imagining of how crimi-
nal law could work better.45 Second was the strategic use of the constitu-
tional norm of equality. Feminists argued that sexual assault raised 
equality issues. They argued convincingly that the crime was gendered, 
that the way the offence was interpreted and enforced affected women’s 
safety, access to justice and social equality, and insisted that the law 
should not promote or rely on discriminatory stereotypes. To be clear, it 
was not a case of displacing the familiar and critical values of liberty, 
security and fair trial; rather, it was about ensuring that equality was part 
of the mix. It makes a difference, as Professor Boyle pointed out in 1994, 
how we describe the rights at issue in particular legal questions. It is only 
when “all the relevant rights claims [are] on the table together”46 that 
lawyers, law-makers and courts can carefully confront and give meaning 
to the multiple and diverse interests at play in criminal law. 
While the use of the equality norm in sexual assault law reform was 
primarily directed towards the equality interests of victims, subsequent 
cases have demonstrated that attentiveness to equality goes beyond so-
called “victims’ rights”.47 Although not always (or even often) framed in 
the language of equality, it is clear that courts have gone beyond a 
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simplistic equating of equality with victims’ rights, and towards a more 
nuanced understanding of the complexity of rights claims which are 
engaged by the criminal law. Appellate court policy on interventions 
reflects an institutional commitment to multi-dimensionality. Consider, 
for example, the case of R. v. Mabior,48 which was argued at the Supreme 
Court in January 2012. The issue in Mabior is the relevance of viral load 
to the disclosure obligations resting on HIV-positive accused.49 The 
larger question is how the criminal law should respond to the evolving 
social challenge of HIV/AIDS, a question that implicates both the liberty 
and equality interests of sero-positive individuals, themselves a group 
characterized by multiple and intersecting grounds of inequality, as well 
as the liberty and equality interests of those potentially put at risk by a 
failure to disclose. Interveners in Mabior include the Canadian 
HIV/AIDS Legal Network, HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario, Positive 
Living Society of British Columbia, the Black Coalition for AIDS 
Prevention, the Canadian Aboriginal AIDS Network, L’institut national 
de santé publique du Quebec and the British Columbia Civil Liberties 
Association. 
I am convinced that the combination of attentiveness to multi-
dimensionality and context, combined with a commitment to a constitu-
tionalized equality value can reshape the ways in which we think about 
much of the criminal law. Three recent cases offer examples. In R. v. 
Tran,50 the Supreme Court considered the availability and scope of the 
provocation defence in a factual context charged with equality dimen-
sions. Justice Charron, speaking for the unanimous Court, concluded 
that: 
[T]he ordinary person standard must be informed by contemporary 
norms of behaviour, including fundamental values such as the 
commitment to equality provided for in the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. For example, it would be appropriate to ascribe to the 
ordinary person relevant racial characteristics if the accused were the 
recipient of a racial slur, but it would not be appropriate to ascribe to 
the ordinary person the characteristic of being homophobic if the 
accused were the recipient of a homosexual advance. Similarly, there 
can be no place in this objective standard for antiquated beliefs such as 
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‘adultery is the highest invasion of property’ [reference omitted], nor 
indeed for any form of killing based on such inappropriate 
conceptualizations of ‘honour’.51 
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford,52 the Ontario Court of Ap-
peal considered a constitutional challenge to the sections of the Criminal 
Code which “indirectly restrict the practice of prostitution by criminaliz-
ing various related activities”.53 The court struck down the “bawdy 
house” provision pursuant to section 7 of the Charter and identified a 
section 7 defect in the “living on the avails” provision which it cured by 
reading in a phrase limiting the provision to “circumstances of exploita-
tion”. The Court was divided on the constitutionality of the “communi-
cating provision”, with the differences between the majority and minority 
primarily reflecting a disagreement on the significance of the impact of 
the provision on street prostitutes. Justice MacPherson, in dissent, 
focuses on the particular and disproportionate vulnerability of street 
prostitutes and holds that “the equality values underlying s. 15 of the 
Charter require careful consideration of the adverse effects of the 
provision on disadvantaged groups”.54 Relying on the decision of 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. in New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Commu-
nity Services) v. G. (J.),55 MacPherson J. concludes that the section 7 
analysis needs to take account of the pre-existing inequalities that 
characterize the lives of the most vulnerable sex workers, whose experi-
ences reflect multiple intersecting inequalities related to gender, race, 
sexual orientation and disability.56 
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Finally, in R. v. Ipeelee,57 the Supreme Court engages in an extended 
review of section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and its decision in R. v. 
Gladue.58 Ipeelee includes, in my view, a quite remarkable discussion of 
how courts can respond to the existence of systemic discrimination 
through the sentencing process. Justice LeBel writes: 
Canadian criminal law is based on the premise that criminal liability 
only follows from voluntary conduct. Many Aboriginal offenders find 
themselves in situations of social and economic deprivation with a lack 
of opportunities and limited options for positive development. While 
this rarely — if ever — attains a level where one could properly say 
that their actions were not voluntary and therefore not deserving of 
criminal sanction, the reality is that their constrained circumstances 
may diminish their moral culpability. ... Failing to take these 
circumstances into account would violate the fundamental principle of 
sentencing — that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of 
the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.59 
Although LeBel J. does not use the word “equality”, the decision is 
enriched by his attention to the “devastating intergenerational effects of 
the collective experiences of Aboriginal peoples”,60 the ways in which 
those effects have translated into “lower educational attainment, lower 
incomes, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuse and 
suicide, and of course higher levels of incarceration”,61 and the potential 
disproportionate and adverse impact of apparently neutral sentencing 
criteria in a context characterized by systemic inequality. The Court 
concludes that a just sanction does not “operate in a discriminatory 
manner”, and sentencing judges have an obligation to ensure that their 
sentences are not contributing to, or exacerbating “ongoing systemic 
racial discrimination”.62 In other words, sentencing judges need to attend 
to equality. 
VI. CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE AHEAD 
There is a certain irony in the fact that the social justice challenge 
currently preoccupying criminal lawyers is the use of mandatory mini-
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mums, given the fact that mandatory minimums were at issue in the early 
and foundational section 7 cases. In 2007, Professor Roach argued that 
excessively retributivist criminal justice policies and increased reliance 
on imprisonment through the use of mandatory minimums were impedi-
ments to the advancement of justice. He also predicted that “this policy 
trend will in all likelihood not be restrained by the Charter and the 
courts”.63 I think he may be wrong. The suggestion that the Charter may 
be largely irrelevant to a criminal justice policy which will dramatically 
exacerbate prison overcrowding, worsen prison conditions, distort the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, interfere with the practice of plea 
bargaining, and have a disproportionate and discriminatory impact on 
Aboriginal peoples, racialized individuals, the mentally ill, their families 
and communities of support might lead one to decide, as Harry Arthurs 
has powerfully argued, to “say no to the constitution”.64 
I am not prepared to do that. I think that the ideologically driven and 
evidence-disregarding imposition of mandatory minimums is vulnerable 
to Charter challenge. Both R. v. Ipeelee and R. v. Smickle,65 in which 
Molloy J. concluded that the three-year minimum in section 95(2) was, 
on the facts before her, fundamentally unfair, outrageous, abhorrent, 
intolerable and arbitrary, offer fodder for constitutional challenge.66 It is 
not my intention here to analyze the ways in which mandatory mini-
mums are constitutionally infirm. Rather, I want to suggest that our 
constitutional analysis must be alive to equality, either as an interpretive 
lens through which other rights are constructed, or as a stand-alone claim 
about the discriminatory adverse impacts of mandatory minimums. 
As my colleague Elizabeth Sheehy has noted, Canadian courts have 
not yet been called upon to evaluate mandatory minimum sentencing 
against equality standards.67 She offers a compelling argument that 
mandatory minimums violate section 15 through their disparate impact 
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on Aboriginal peoples, other racialized groups and women, particularly 
Aboriginal and racialized women. Unfortunately, when systemic equality 
arguments are raised in courts, judges seem reluctant to adopt them, 
particularly when the claims are based on the compounding and aggra-
vating impact of limiting judicial discretion. In two recent cases, R. v. 
Johnson68 and R. v. Nur,69 trial judges have faced these kinds of claims in 
the context of the so-called “Truth in Sentencing Act” and the mandatory 
minimum penalty in section 95(2) of the Criminal Code. In R. v. John-
son, Green J. concludes that “the impact of lengthier sentences will be 
disproportionately absorbed by historically disadvantaged and vulnerable 
groups, particularly Aboriginal and mentally ill offenders”.70 In addition, 
he accepts that the “custodial sentencing disadvantage visited on those 
detained in custody pending their trials as a consequence of the Bill C-25 
amendments would only be compounded in the case of black persons as 
they are more likely than members of other races to be denied bail.”71 
Despite these conclusions, he finds no violation of section 15, concluding 
that: 
[T]he current demographic evidence relating to pre-trial custody 
suggests that detention orders are correlated with considerations such as 
attenuated community ties, unemployment and a history of prior 
criminality. These factors may disproportionately characterize members 
of the black and Aboriginal community, but they are present in all 
racial and ethnic groups and are far from universal or defining features 
of persons sharing either of the Applicant’s ancestries. Further, the 
Applicant’s argument, logically pursued, renders much of criminal law 
— or, at minimum, those statutory instruments bearing on penal 
sanctions — vulnerable to s. 15 challenge on the same footing. This 
hardly seems tenable.72 
Similarly, in R. v. Nur, Code J. appears to accept the evidence that 
62.1 per cent of the charges laid under section 95 between May 1, 2006 
and October 31, 2010 involved Black accused, undoubtedly, in his 
opinion, “a disproportionately high number”.73 And yet, he also con-
cludes that there is no violation of section 15, concluding that the law 
itself is not the cause of discriminatory impact: 
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It is not difficult to establish that poverty, unemployment, poor housing 
and weak family structures contribute to the proliferation of gang 
culture and gun crime. It is also not difficult to establish that these 
phenomena will attract heavy police attention and will lead to the 
laying of large numbers of s. 95 charges. Finally, it is not difficult to 
establish that anti-black discrimination undoubtedly contributes to 
many of these underlying societal causes. However, none of this 
establishes that s. 95 itself violates s. 15 of the Charter. ... The s. 15 
arguments advanced by the Applicant and the Intervener could be made 
in relation to any provision of the Criminal Code that results in 
mandatory imprisonment, for example, the sentence for the offence of 
murder. If disproportionate numbers of blacks are charged with murder 
because of the discriminatory impact of poverty, unemployment, poor 
housing and biased law enforcement decisions, would it be appropriate 
to strike down the mandatory minimum penalty for murder? Obviously 
not.74 
These judgments reveal much about the challenges of making sys-
temic inequality legally relevant to claims about the treatment of individ-
ual accused. They also reveal much about the poverty of our thinking 
about equality. The challenge of identifying and taking seriously com-
petitive truths is the challenge of being prepared to re-examine what 
might be obvious, and what is, or might be, tenable. The Charter offers a 
jurisprudential vehicle for that re-examination. The last 30 years of 
decision-making in criminal justice has been characterized by an increas-
ing willingness to address complexity and an increasing openness to 
multiple voices. I think that both of those trends are consistent with a 
commitment to operationalizing the equality value in the criminal law. I 
want to conclude by suggesting three things. One, we need to take 
account of equality in our conceptualization of the constitutional infirmi-
ties of, for example, mandatory minimums. Two, we need to name 
inequality as one of the unconstitutional results of limiting judicial 
discretion at the sentencing stage, discretion which in fact reflects 
principles of substantive equality. Three, we need to be prepared to hear 
from those who might offer competitive truths about the justness of our 
justice system. Our democratic commitments to both social justice and 
equality require it. 
                                                                                                             
74 Id., at paras. 79-80. 
